Gestalt structures in multi-person intersubjectivity by Pawlett Jackson, Sarah
Open Research Online
The Open University’s repository of research publications
and other research outputs
Gestalt structures in multi-person intersubjectivity
Journal Item
How to cite:
Pawlett Jackson, Sarah (2021). Gestalt structures in multi-person intersubjectivity. Synthese, 198 pp. 2365–2382.
For guidance on citations see FAQs.
c© 2018 Sarah Pawlett Jackson
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Version: Version of Record
Link(s) to article on publisher’s website:
http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1007/s11229-018-02001-y
Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright
owners. For more information on Open Research Online’s data policy on reuse of materials please consult the policies
page.
oro.open.ac.uk
Synthese (2021) 198 (Suppl 9):S2365–S2382
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-02001-y
S . I . : GESTALT PHENOMENOLOGY AND EMBODIED
COGNIT IVE SC IENCE
Gestalt structures in multi-person intersubjectivity
Sarah Pawlett Jackson1
Received: 12 May 2018 / Accepted: 25 October 2018 / Published online: 30 October 2018
© The Author(s) 2018
Abstract
In this paper I argue that there are gestalt principles underlying intersubjective inter-
actions and that this means that intersubjective ‘units’, can be recognised as unified
gestalt wholes. The nub of the claim is that interactions within a ‘plural subject’ can
be perceived by others outside this plural subject. Framed from the first-person per-
spective: I am able to recognise intersubjective interactions between multiple others
who are not me. I argue that the terminology of gestalt structures is helpful in framing
and understanding the non-reducible make-up of these relational units. I consequently
defend the legitimacy of the claim that we can attend to more than one other person
at once, holding multiple others as a single focus of attention insofar as we can attend
to multiple others as a gestalt whole. I argue that it is therefore legitimate to talk
about attending to, perceiving and addressing multiple others at the same time, in the
second-person plural. I argue that this can be identified in the phenomenology of such
interactions and in an analysis of the core underlying structures of these interactions.
Keywords Gestalt structure · Phenomenology · Intersubjectivity · Second-person
standpoint · First-person plural · Plural address
We conclude that the formation and change of impressions consist of specific
processes of organization. Further, it seems probable that these processes are not
specific to impressions of persons alone. It is a task for future investigation to
determine whether processes of this order are at work in other important regions
of psychology, such as in forming the view of a group, or the relations between
one person and another. (Asch 1946, p. 278)
B Sarah Pawlett Jackson
Sarah.Pawlett-Jackson@open.ac.uk
1 The Open University, Milton Keynes, UK
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1 Introduction
Gestalt theory and phenomenology are historically and conceptually intertwined, with
both methodologies genealogically rooted in Franz Brentano’s interest in the percep-
tion of objects and events not just as loose bundles but as unified ‘wholes’ (Grossman
1984, pp. 41–59; Heinämaa 2009, pp. 268–273). Both are premised on the insight
that subjectivity, as embodied and embedded in its environment, ‘is not a concealed
interiority, but an open world relation’ (Zahavi 2008, pp. 664–665). While the rela-
tionship between the schools of thought has been historically complex, with critiques
issued on both sides [e.g. Husserl 2012, p. 45; Koffka 1935, p. 73)], I will focus here
on ways that the methodologies can be employed in overlapping and complementary
ways, demonstrating this by example.1 There are various debates in phenomenology
where the language of gestalt theory has been largely absent. One such debate, in
which this paper is situated, is in the phenomenology of intersubjectivity. My paper
thus has a dual hope: it purports to be valuable for its own sake in its contribution to
the philosophy of intersubjectivity, but it also functions as an example of how phe-
nomenological and gestalt approaches can mutually complement one another, towards
a non-reductive analysis of a specific phenomenon.
In this paper I specifically argue that there are gestalt principles underlying inter-
subjective interactions and that this means that intersubjective ‘units’, such as ‘plural
subjects’,2 can be recognised as unified ‘wholes’. The nub of my claim is that inter-
subjective interactions between multiple subjects can be perceived by others, a claim
relevant to both detached observation and engaged participation of and with these
interactions. Framed from the first-person perspective: I am able to recognise inter-
subjective interactions between multiple others who are not me. I argue here that
the terminology of gestalt structure is helpful in framing and understanding the non-
reducible make-up of these ‘plural subjects’ or other relational units: intersubjective
awareness between subjects has a set of basic ‘shapes’ or structures that can be under-
stood as gestalt.
In this paper I hence defend the legitimacy of the claim that we can attend to more
than one other person at once, holding multiple others as a single focus of attention
insofar as we can attend to multiple others as a unified whole. I will argue that it is
legitimate to talk about attending to, perceiving and addressing (as a participant as
well as an observer) multiple others simultaneously as subjects-together with a gestalt
form. I argue that this can be identified in the phenomenology of such interactions and
in an analysis of the core underlying structures of these interactions.
This is underexplored terrain, in part because little has been done to apply gestalt
principles to the metaphysics of intersubjectivity, but also because analysing the per-
ception of relationships is distinct from the task of analysing (i) the perception of other
subjects or (ii) perception as part of a group. Far more work needs to be done, I claim,
1 For an excellent overview of some of the historical and conceptual influences between phenomenology
and gestalt theory, see Heinämaa (2009).
2 I take the term ‘plural subject’ from Margaret Gilbert (2013). Gilbert defines a plural subject as ‘any set
of jointly committed persons’ (p. 9). This idea of ‘jointness’ will be outlined in more detail in §2. My own
use of this term will become clearer in this section and my use of this terminology does not require total
buy-into Gilbert’s ontology.
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onwhat it is like to recognise and interact not just with another person, butwith another
relationship. This work on the recognition of others-in-relation as gestalt wholes can
be applied to an observer’s recognition of a plural subject—that is, to recognition
from the third-person perspective—but much more interestingly, I argue, it opens up
space for thinking about more complex forms of intersubjectivity proper, namely how
a subject might engage a plural subject in a genuinely second-person plural address,
something underexplored in the philosophy of intersubjectivity.
The need for this analysis is symptomatic of the fact that, to date, the philosophy of
intersubjectivity has focused on either the second-person singular or the first-person
plural (as contrasted with the third-person standpoint, singular or plural), but nowhere
do we find an in-depth analysis of the second-person plural. This is part of a more
general trend in the philosophy of intersubjectivity which has been slow to look at
forms of at multi-person interaction (that is, interactions that involve more than two
subjects) beyond the first-person plural. I focus here on the possibility of second-
personal plural address, but there are a whole range of multi-person structures that the
exclusive focus on the ‘we’ and the ‘I-you’ are apt to miss.3
As part of thinking about what is involved in a robust account of the second-
person plural I will first outline some of the relevant background assumptions about
the nature of (different types of) intersubjectivity and will identify in more detail
this gap in the literature. I will then lay out some of the basic principles of gestalt
theory and will identify aspects I take to be relevant to my analysis. Having laid out
these presuppositions I make the case that multi-person intersubjectivity, specifically
the second-person plural, can be understood to exhibit gestalt structure and gestalt
qualities by looking at the phenomenology and the structure of specific interactions.
2 Multi-person intersubjectivity: situating the discussion
In this first section I will lay out some of the basic conditions of an intersubjective
interaction and will outline the two main varieties of intersubjectivity discussed in
the literature, namely the first-person plural and the second-person singular. Having
done this I will lay out examples of multi-person interactions which cannot be fully
understood in terms of either of these forms of intersubjectivity alone, and I will argue
that non-reductive analyses of these kinds of multi-person phenomena, such as the
second-person plural, are needed.
‘Intersubjectivity’ refers to the relations and sets of relations between subjects qua
subjects. These are not just spatial or temporal relations as may exist between objects,
but are relations of mutual awareness of one another as subjects (Gallagher 2008;
Reddy 2010; Zahavi 2014). It is possible for me to perceive the subjectivity of another
without this being mutual, such as when I perceive someone getting frustrated with
a parking meter, without their being aware that I am there, for example, where my
3 This is a bigger project than this standalone paper can achieve and is the substance of my doctoral research
project (in progress). In thismore extended research on this topic, I considermore of the philosophical issues
raised by the second-person plural standpoint. I also sketch out a range of other possible multi-person
intersubjective structures, including the we-you and the we-yous. See also Pawlett Jackson (2016) for some
further analysis and application of these structures.
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standpoint towards them is third-personal. However, for a relation to be properly inter-
subjective, on my understanding, it must involve mutual recognition of one another
as subjects, and this recognition, in Naomi Eilan’s phrase, must be ‘out in the open’
between us, ‘manifest to both participants’. (Eilan 2005, p. 1. See also Gilbert 1992;
Schutz 1972, p. 168). Two people may perceive each other as subjects but not yet be
aware that the other is aware of them, meaning that the recognition is not yet mutual.
Imagine two people who know each other in a crowded room of others. At different
points they notice each other across the room but they are not sure if the other has
seen them. Eventually their attempts to catch the eye of the other are successfully
co-ordinated—their mutual awareness is now ‘out in the open’ between them.4
Dyadic intersubjectivity, then, has the following formal structure:
1. A is aware of B
2. B is aware of A
3. 1 and 2 are ‘out in the open’ between A and B
There are a number of different structures or types of intersubjectivitywhich exhibit the
structures of mutual awareness outlined above. The literature has essentially focused
on just two types of intersubjectivity, namely ‘I-you’ intersubjectivity and ‘we’ inter-
subjectivity.
Reciprocal intersubjective awareness takes a particular ‘shape’ in ‘I-you’ intersub-
jectivity’. This kind of interaction is characterised structurally by a direct, ‘frontal
confrontation’ (Zahavi 2001, p. 157), which involves ‘mutual attention’ (Reddy 2005,
pp. 85–109) or ‘mutual recognition’ (Gilbert 1992, pp. 217–219) between a pair. In
this configuration one other person is the focus of my attention, and I am the focus
of theirs, I am subject to ‘the look’ of the other (Sartre 2003, pp. 276–326). This
orientation is said to be ‘face-to-face,’ or en face (Levinas 1994), with the quality of
directed and undivided focus towards one another crucial to this standpoint. In such
an encounter we take up what we would call the second-person (singular) standpoint:
in this configuration I am oriented towards this one other person such that I can intel-
ligibly address them by the second-person pronoun ‘you’, and they reciprocally are
able to address me with a ‘you’. This is the standpoint we take up in most forms
of everyday conversation, characterised by the exchange of looks and a ‘turn-taking’
structure of dialogue (Stawarska 2009, pp. 105–114). Developmental, psychological,
4 Exactly how we are to best define the character and structure of this ‘mutuality’ or ‘openness’ that
genuine intersubjectivity requires remains an ongoing debate in the philosophy of intersubjectivity. Eilan,
for example, who I take this phrase from, notes that there are epistemological, conceptual and social
questions as to how we are to best understand the nature and development of this openness (see Eilan
2005, p. 4). There are many discussions which further consider the quality of intersubjective awareness
as necessarily affective and participatory, for example (see e.g. Eilan 2005; Reddy 2010; Schilbach et al.
2013). These are questions posed to all forms of intersubjectivity, both dyadic and multi-person, concerning
the second-person singular and the first-person plural as much as the second-person plural. I will not be
focusing here on the further questions about the nature of this openness, but will take for granted that this
is nevertheless a non-negotiable feature of genuine intersubjectivity that distinguishes it from detached,
observational perspectives, and can be meaningfully presupposed even where consensus about exactly how
this should be defined is lacking. Openness (however exactly it is to be characterised) is the state in which
all parties’ awareness of one another is ‘mutually manifest’: if only one party were aware of the other’s
awareness (again, however exactly this ‘awareness’ is defined) then this could not be an intersubjective
engagement.
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philosophical and moral aspects of the second-person singular have been discussed
extensively in the literature (Thompson 2001; Darwall 2009; Schilbach et al. 2013;
Eilan 2014).
By contrast, the structure or shape of ‘we’ intersubjectivity has all participant sub-
jects’ attention focused towards a common ‘object’ (which might be a physical object,
a fact, an event, or even the relationship itself) with some peripheral awareness that
the other participants are also attending to the same object or event. This basic struc-
ture is captured by the much-discussed phenomenon of joint attention (Eilan 2005;
Cavell 2006; Seemann 2012). This basic subject-subject-object structure is founda-
tion of more complex varieties of collective intentionality and joint action. This basic
structure can be identified where an infant and her caregiver watch a squirrel together
in the park, or in the more complex joint action where two people carry a table down
some stairs together. Crucially this mutual peripheral awareness of the other changes
the phenomenological structure of the experience for both parties. Watching a squirrel
‘together’ with someone is different to a case in which both subjects attend to the
squirrel simultaneously, but are not aware of each other’s awareness, so do not expe-
rience this as something we are ‘doing together.’ In such a configuration someone
‘comes to share a focus of attention with someone else.’ (Hobson 2005, p. 185). This
awareness of ‘sharedness’ or ‘jointness’ transforms how the world (object, event, etc.)
is experienced. To be part of a ‘we’ is to experience a shared world.5
The basic definitions and distinctions between ‘I-you’ and ‘we’ intersubjectivity are
recognised by developmental psychologists and philosophers (Bakeman andAdamson
1984; Trevarthen 1979; Reddy 2010; Rochat 2014; Zahavi 2014, 2015; Stern 2018)
and widely accepted as the two basic forms of intersubjectivity. Much of this work
identifies the need to think about these intersubjective interactions (both ‘I-you’ and
‘we’) as non-reducible to the ‘aggregates’ (Gilbert 2013, p. 59) of the individual
subjects that constitute them. In short, the mutual recognition in either an ‘I-you’
or a ‘we’ interaction births something that is more than the sum of its parts. An
‘intersubjective approach’ to social ontologyhence rejects ‘singularism’ (Gilbert 2013,
p. 42) or ‘methodological individualism’ (Zahavi 2014, p. 242) as a viable approach
to analysing these kinds of interpersonal interaction.
Intersubjectivity theorists, then, have championed non-reductive social ontologies.
The reasons given have been phenomenological and structural. Phenomenological
insofar as there is a discernible difference in, for example, the quality of an experience
where we attend to something together, versus one where we attend in parallel, as
already outlined. The reasons are structural insofar as clear structures of reciprocal
awareness can be identified as constitutive of these phenomena, namely 1–3 above (I
am aware of you, and you of me, and this is ‘out in the open’ between us.) While at
first glance it might look like a 1–3 checklist is the paragon of a reductive analysis,
the fact that (3) constitutively includes reference to (1) and (2) precisely demonstrates
the non-reducibility of the whole to separate unrelated parts.
5 There are different types of we-intersubjectivity (joint action differs from shared belief, for example), and
competing accounts of exactly how we are to understand how we act as a ‘we’, (Bratman 1999; Tuomela
2013; Gilbert 2013), however, all that is necessary here for my purposes is a grasp of the basic structure of
awareness required for joint attention.
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While there is a huge amount of valuable work which discusses the nature of I-you
and we interactions, and this work provides the framework for thinking about more
complex interactions, these complex ‘group dynamics’ (as psychology might have
it), have not been much analysed by those thinking philosophically about the nature
of intersubjective standpoints. It is these more complex intersubjective structures and
standpoints that emerge in triadic and multi-person interactions that I am interested in
here. As I have already indicated, it is the second-person plural standpoint that I will
focus on here.
Reflection on our ordinary experience should make clear the kinds of interactions
that are purportedly second-person plural in structure. When we say to the couple
who have hosted us ‘Thank you so much for your hospitality’, or we say to a pair of
friends ‘see you next week’, we are addressing more than one person at once with
this ‘you’—which might be more helpfully referred to as ‘yous’. This is not just a
playing with words but, I argue, there is a phenomenology attached to recognising and
relating to a pair as a pair, which cannot be reduced to two separate I-you relationships
in parallel. There is a quality to receiving the hospitality of a couple, for example,
in a home shaped by their joint attention, joint intention, joint commitment and joint
action, that means that this ‘thank you (yous) for your hospitality’ means something
different to the ‘thank you’ that might be spoken to each one separately (and in turn,
these separate singular addresses capture something distinct from the plural address). I
want to call this the second-person plural address or an I-yous structured address. If this
is right, then in my address I am not only perceiving and addressing each of my friends
as subjects, but I am also perceiving thatwhich is between them, intersubjectively—the
‘in-between’ (De Jaegher et al. 2017)—and this is constitutive of the possibility and
meaning of my address to them as a plural subject.
My claim is that this I-yous structure, which minimally involves at least three
subjects, should be properly understood as a unified intersubjective whole, just as
an I-you encounter or a collective experience as a ‘we’ are intersubjective wholes.
Not only this, but that the plural subject addressed as a ‘yous’ is recognisable by the
addresser as a unified whole, capable of receiving a single address.
For clarity, as above, the argument that we can perceive multiple others as plural
subjects via gestalt perception is a point that can be applied to the observational (third-
personal) stance of ‘I-they’ as well as the participatory (second-personal) stance of
‘I-yous’. I ammore interested to think about how this gestalt perception might work in
caseswhere I take a second-personal stance towards the plural subjects I identity. A full
defence of the second-person plural requires more than I have space to consider in this
paper, for, as I go on to outline, a second-person plural requires not only that I am able
to perceive and address multiple others as a unified ‘plural subject’, but also that the
members of this plural subject are co-ordinated such that they can jointly attend to me,
can receive my address as directed to them as a plural subject, and can co-ordinate a
joint reply—that is, can reply to me with an address as a plural subject—which I argue
elsewhere is possible in a number of ways. This part of the second-person plural is the
‘other side’ of my recognition of multiple others as a plural subject, namely it is their
recognition of me (as a subject) and their joint response to me (second-personally) as
such. This I call the ‘we-you’, which is the inverse or the ‘other side’ of the I-yous.
As analysis, explanation and justification of the possibility of the we-yous is a whole
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distinct section of the project of analysing the second-person plural, I will not focus
on this ‘side’ of the interaction here for reasons of space. I look at this as part of the
bigger project that this argument is situated in, which seeks to give a full justification
of the substantiality of the second-person plural. The focus in this paper is the role
that gestalt perception plays in the second-person plural, so I am here focusing on the
I-yous, which specifically involves this gestalt perception.6
To be clear, I am not only claiming here that in engaging another subject I recog-
nise them as a gestalt whole, nor that our ‘I-you’ or ‘we’ intersubjective recognition
of one another is a non-reductive whole, although both of these are true. My empha-
sis is that the intersubjective awareness between an other and another other is also
something that I can perceive as a gestalt whole. This is not something that can be
taken for granted. While it is obvious that we can in some way observe interactions
between people other than ourselves, the question for the philosopher of intersubjectiv-
ity is whether these interactions are recognised as genuinely intersubjective, and—my
interest here—whether they can be brought into my own intersubjective interactions
as such. There is a line of thought which denies or ignores the possibility of our recog-
nition of other plural subjects as properly intersubjective. This line of thought can be
traced in the intersubjectivity literature, with its focus on the second-person singular
but not the second-person plural.
The position that I’m arguing for therefore stands opposed to the claim that these
variousmulti-person structures canbe analysed sufficiently in termsof their constituent
dyads. This dyadic approach may claim that to address a group or a pair is, as a matter
of surface grammar, to engage in a second-person plural address, but when we actually
look at what is going on we find that we are addressing one person. This person is
a spokesperson (or receptive equivalent) for the others. When I thank my friends
for their hospitality, this is in fact an address directed to each of them separately, in
parallel, with each address referring to ‘the other other’ in its content, but not its form.
This interaction can hence be given in terms of the dyadic interaction I have with the
addressee, and their dyadic interactionswith the other or others in the group, which can
be considered separately. We find this dyadic approach in Sartre and Buber’s accounts
of intersubjectivity, as well as explicitly in the contemporary analysis given by Beata
Stawarska (Buber 1996; Sartre 2003; Stawarska 2009).
The dyadic approach asserts that while I may be able to be peripherally aware of
other others when I address the primary other, or while I might be able to engage other
others indirectly by bringing content from other interactions into the content of this
one, I nevertheless can only have one focus of attention, and so I can only directly
attend to and address one person at a time. I might be able to switch between second-
person singular standpoints, giving the impression that I address multiple others at the
same time, but, goes this line of argument, this is not strictly true.
This is an important concern worth taking seriously. If a second-person plural
address is genuinely second-personal, it must involve a quality and focus of direct
mutual attention, so the question arises as to how I can attend to more than one person
at once. If my attention is split or broken, then it cannot be genuinely second-personal.
I face this worry by arguing that the second-person plural is not simply a matter
6 See fn.3.
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of surface grammar, but is as metaphysically substantial as the first, second and third
person singular standpoints. Taking seriously the fact that the second-person standpoint
must involve focused mutual attention between addresser and addressee, I will argue
that this is possible in part because plural subjects exhibit gestalt qualities. This means
that the kinds of multi-person interactions I have in mind not only cannot be reduced
to the mere addition of the participating individual subjects, but that they also cannot
be reduced to the mere addition of any of the participating dyadic interactions within
the multi-person structure.
Again, to clarify, there are two aspects to this. First, when we observe or analyse
multi-person interactions third-personally, we can point to the structure of such an
interaction and see that this is a unified whole, composed of parts-in-relation, i.e. that
these interactions have an underlying structure and as a result exhibit properties that
are more than the sum of their parts—both their parts as the individuals involved, and
the dyads involved. Second, thinking about the phenomenology of perception through
the lens of gestalt theory also helps us think about how we engage as participants in
multi-person intersubjective interactions, namely, as I have already mentioned, how
it is that we can recognise and address multiple others as a unified relational unit
or whole. Having laid out the claim I want to argue for, I now turn to the some of
the theory underpinning gestalt psychology so as to establish the legitimacy of this
application.
3 Gestalt structure
Gestalt theory taken broadly argues that perception is not only of individual things,
but also of the relations that hold them together, which comprise a thing’s form or
structure. (Grossman 1984, pp. 41–59). As Köhler puts it:
‘Parts of molar perceptual units often have characteristics which they do not
exhibit when separated from those units. Within a larger visual entity, a part
may, for instance, be a corner of this entity, another part is contour or boundary,
and so on. It now seems obvious, but nobody in psychology had seen it before: the
same happens in any physical system that is pervaded by interactions.’ (Köhler
1959, pp. 4–5)
By way of illustrating in more detail the nature of gestalt perception, I want to focus
on the famous example of perceiving gestalt qualities aurally in listening to a piece of
music, used by Christian von Ehrenfels in his analysis of ‘temporal gestalt qualities’
(von Ehrenfels 1988, pp. 97–100).7 When we listen to a piece of music we don’t hear
a set of notes in isolation from one another, otherwise we wouldn’t hear them as a
piece of music—as a melody—which is a unified whole. Each note has a place in
the structure of the whole. The phenomenology of each part is constituted not just by
the immediate impression but by its place within the whole. The musical case brings
to attention more clearly how a multiplicity of ‘individual’ perceptions—in this case
7 Work on gestalt structures itself has been heterogenous, with different interpretations on the exact nature
of gestalt qualities. Analysis of these more detailed discussions is not needed for my purposes here, and as
such I will focus on gestalt qualities as originally articulated by Ehrenfels.
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musical notes—stand in a complex set of relations to one another, creating patterns. It
is these patterns, these relations and sets of relations, that we perceive as the form of
the music. ‘Patterns…clearly demonstrate that it is relations among…objects which
decide what objects become group members, and what others do not, and where,
therefore, one group separates itself from one another,’ says Köhler (1959, p. 3).
It is notable that this musical example is also used by Husserl in his analysis of
the lived experience of temporality or ‘time-consciousness’ itself. Husserl famously
articulates the phenomenology of time-consciousness as having a threefold structure,
that of impression, retention and protention. (Husserl 1991, pp. 5–25 and Husserl
1977. See also Zahavi and Thompson 2007, pp. 77–78). As we’ve noted, when we
listen to a piece of music at any moment in time we experience the immediate note, but
we also retain in consciousness what has just passed, and we protend (reach forward)
in consciousness to what is next. At any moment there is a note that we immediately
perceive, but this perception in some way includes the perception of the previous note
within the horizon of the current perception itself. We recognise events unfolding in
time as unified wholes rather than a set of disconnected moments.
This is not to say that the individual notes are not heard as separate notes. Clearly,
they are. The unity of a piece of music is not the unity of a homogenous sound: if the
individual notes were not heard as distinct from one another then the piece wouldn’t
be heard as a piece of music, but as invariant noise! As Solomon Asch puts it, when
discussing the perception of the unity of persons: ‘It is…far from the observed facts
to describe the process as the forming of a homogeneous, undifferentiated “general
impression.”’(Asch 1946, p. 278). When listening to a melody the unity perceived is
rather the unity of notes-in-relation, notes-in-a-pattern.
Insofar as we think about listening to a piece of music, it is because of the structure
of time-consciousness that we perceive notes in the past as building towards those
playing in the ‘immediate now’ of the present. These notes ‘are continually being
stamped with new characteristics,’ (Cohen and Moran 2012, p. 227). It is for this
reason also that we can know that an unfamiliar piece of music has been cut off in
the middle, because we perceive the notes together as a whole, rather than just the
individual notes in isolation from one another. We are capable of being surprised or
startled because we ‘reach forward’ into what is coming next.
It is worth saying that retention is not the same as recollection from any other point
in the past, and protention is not the same as an expectation of something further
off in the future. Retention and protention are constitutive features of every lived
experience which make possible the recognition of unfolding events as unfolding and
connected. Unlike remembering what happened yesterday or anticipating what will
happen tomorrow, retention and protention are automatic, unconscious and necessary
features of the lived experience of events as temporal.
Lanei Rodemeyer gives a helpful summary:
In a phenomenological analysis of the experience of a series of musical notes,
we notice [that]…these notes influence one another; they are not experienced as
a series of individual, independent notes that happen to be played and heard. In
other words, the perception of these notes is not simply of each individual note
while it is immediately before consciousness. Instead, my experience gives the
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notes as reflecting on one another, playing in relation to one another, creating
harmonies etc.….I actually experience several notes in their different qualities
at once: The experience of the last few that have been played is held onto by
consciousness. (Rodemeyer 2006, pp. 8–9).
This leads Ehrenfels to conclude that a melody is not a ‘mere sum [Zusammenfassung]
of elements’ but is ‘something novel in relation to this sum, something that certainly
goes hand in hand with, but is indistinguishable from, the sum of elements’ (von
Ehrenfels 1988, p. 83).
The two key points I want to focus on here are that (i) gestalt qualities are non-
reductive properties, and (ii) gestalt qualities are grounded in underlying structures
which really exist. The first of these emphasises that there is something still ‘left
over’ once all the notes that make up a melody have been ‘counted’. The structure
of the piece cannot be taken out of the perception without destroying the whole. In
Grossman’s words:
What we perceive, to put the theory in a nutshell, are not mere sets of perceptual
stimuli, but are structures of stimuli. Consequently, what we experience are not
mere sets of sensations, but structures consisting of sensations. This basic insight
was often summed up in the slogan: a whole is more than the sum of its parts!
In our terminology, it becomes the ontological law: a structure is not the same
as the set of its parts. (Grossman 1984, p. 59).
The second point, that Gestalt qualities are grounded in underlying structures which
really exist, is to say that there really are, for example, a set of relations of notes that
make up the musical form that we perceive. This is what Ehrenfels called ‘the foun-
dation [Grundlage] of that quality’ (von Ehrenfels 1988, p. 93). The consequence of
this is that if gestalt qualities are given by the form as a whole rather than merely the
component parts, a similar (or isomorphic) form (but different parts) should therefore
nevertheless give a similar set of perceivable qualities. For example, a piece of music
is recognisable as having the same form even if all the component parts are differen-
t—if the whole piece is an octave lower, for example. Ehrenfels states this explicitly:
‘…Proof of the existence of Gestalt qualities is provided, at least in the sphere of visual
and aural presentations, by the similarity relations…which obtain between melodies
and figures having totally different tonal or positional foundations’ (von Ehrenfels
1988, p. 90).
We cannot just help ourselves to gestalt qualities wherever we feel like it, of course.
Ehrenfels is clear that gestalt qualities have to be earned, as is Kurt Koffka, who
notes that ‘just as the category of causality does not mean that any event is causally
connected with another other, so the gestalt category does not mean that any two states
or events belong together in one gestalt.’ (Koffka 1935, p. 22). The characterisation
of gestalt structure given above prevents unregulated appeal to gestalt perception,
because justified appeal to gestalt structure requires that the phenomena in question
fulfil the following criteria:
(i) The qualities in question must be given in the phenomenology of perception,
(ii) It needs to be shown that similar structures have a similar phenomenology, even
if the component parts are different.
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My claim that multi-person phenomena, like the second-person plural, exhibit
gestalt qualities hence needs to be held to account by these criteria. Having outlined
these key features of gestalt perception, I now move to arguing in a more targeted
way that a non-reductive account of multi-person intersubjectivities can indeed be
understood in these gestalt terms.
4 The phenomenology of others-in-relation
There is plenty of precedent for applying gestalt principles to interpersonal relation-
ships and groups, indeed, I would suggest that the work that we find on this maps on to
the work in the philosophy of intersubjectivity on ‘I-you’ and ‘we’ interactions. There
is, for example, precedent for the claim that we can perceive other subjects as gestalt,
rather than as a set of characteristics in parallel with one another. Asch, for example,
notes that ‘the subject can see the person only as a unit, he cannot form an impression
of one-half or of one-quarter of the person.’ (Asch 1946, p. 276). Another person
might be engaged as gestalt on a number of levels, but engaging them as a ‘whole’ is
one of the characteristic marks of the second-person standpoint in the literature. This
‘engaging the other as-a-whole’ is contrasted with the third-person standpoint, which
is liable to deconstruct a person into their attributes or parts. While this analysing
or observational stance is fitting to the third-person perspective, the second-person
cannot fall into this reductive standpoint without destroying the second-person quality
of the interaction. Compare, for example, Buber’s articulation of the I-you with the
language of the gestalt thinkers:
When I confront a human being as my [Thou]…then he is no thing among things
nor does he consist in things. He is no longer He or She, limited by other He’s
and She’s, a dot in the world grid of space and time, nor a condition that can be
experienced and described, a loose bundle of named qualities…Even as amelody
is not composed of tones, nor a verse of words, nor a statue of lines—one must
pull and tear to turn a unity into a multiplicity—so it is with the human being to
whom I say [Thou]. I can abstract from him the colour of his hair or the colour
of his speech or the colour of his graciousness; I have to do this again and again;
but immediately he is no longer [Thou] (Buber 1996, p. 59)
We also find explicit reference to intersubjective groups as gestalt insofar as this
pertains to the first-person plural. Indeed, we find an explicit exploration of this in
the gestalt thinker Koffka, who defines the first-person plural very much in line with
dominant understandings of this phenomenon in the intersubjectivity literature:
The reality of the psychological group finds its expression in the pronoun “we”,
“we” means not simply a plurality of persons which includes myself, it means
in its most proper sense a unified plurality of which I and the others are true
members….The speaker [of the pronoun “we”] experiences himself as part of
a group, and his actions as belonging to this group…[T]he word “we” refers to
a reality. It is never a mere abbreviation of “they and I”, or “he and I”. (Koffka
1935, p. 651)
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Koffka briefly considers the group as a gestalt whole from the first-person plural per-
spective. This to say, we find in the gestalt psychology literature precedent for thinking
about the single other as gestalt in a face-to-face encounter, and for thinking about the
first-person plural group as something more than the sum of its parts. Kurt Lewin’s
‘field theory’ takes seriously the idea that small groups can be understood ‘as ‘natural
dynamic units’ or wholes.’ (Lewin 1943–1944, p. 166) Lewin makes use of gestalt
principles specifically to think about ways that individuals influence and are influenced
by their place in and experience of social groups. He analyses what he calls a subject’s
‘life space’ or ‘hodological space’ as shaped by group dynamics (Burnes and Cooke
2013, p. 414), which in some casesmust implicitly involve concretemulti-person inter-
actions in a group, though this stands in need of fleshing out further. However, even
where some philosophical considerations of the nature of intersubjectivity as gestalt
have been attempted, to my knowledge this has not been with an eye to thinking about
the implications for a more in-depth analysis of the formal structure of intersubjective
standpoints, i.e. contrasting first, second and third-person standpoints, singular and
plural. It is this kind of analysis that I am interested in here, specifically a defence of
the possibility of the under-discussed second-person plural standpoint.
In order to earn this claim, I will need to demonstrate, as above, that (i) gestalt
qualities are exhibited in the phenomenology of the perception of intersubjective
interactions between others, and (ii) that there is a structure or a form underlying the
phenomena in question that produces similar gestalt qualities even if the component
parts are changed. I will start with the phenomenology.
The phenomenological claim is that just as a piece of music is unified in conscious-
ness, so too are certain intersubjective interactions between oneself and multiple other
parties. Let us build up to this claim by starting with the more straightforward case of
a dyadic second-personal interaction. Consider an everyday conversation over coffee
between oneself and another. Just as we don’t merely hear the discrete notes of a piece
of music, but the whole, so too when we perceive and engage with the other in a
conversation we don’t merely perceive each (verbal and non-verbal8) contribution in
isolation, but we follow the ‘ordered flow’ of the interaction, perceiving its structure
and meaning or sets of meanings as a whole. We ‘hold onto’ the last contribution in
consciousness, whether this is a movement, a gesture or a verbal communication, and
as such, the meaning of the immediately present contribution makes sense, creating
an ‘intersubjective melody’ (in a potential range of different ways) with what comes
immediately before and after. In thisway perception and engagement of intersubjective
reality always involves more than an immediate impression: it involves the retention
and protention of the rest of the communicative interaction.
If we shift the thought experiment to think not of a dyadic conversation, but a triadic
one, in which I am engaging with two others, it becomes clear that this retention and
protention is not only identifiable in cases of dyadic intersubjectivity. The ongoing
retention and protention of the movements, gestures and verbal articulations of, not
only the ‘first other’, but also the ‘other other’, are part of our experience in this kind of
small group. These are not merely aggregated and understood post hoc, but contribute
8 I don’t have space here to consider in detail various forms of non-verbal communication. Suffice to say
it is non-controversial that intersubjectivity as I am engaging it includes verbal and non-verbal elements.
See, e.g. Stivers and Sidnell (2005).
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to the unfolding meaning of the whole interaction. For this to be true, structures of
reciprocity between subjects other than me must also be perceived and engaged as
‘wholes’. Not only is the reciprocity between self and other non-reducible, but so is
my perception of the reciprocity between others and other others. If we were not able
to hold the meanings of the communicative words and actions of more than one other
subject within the horizon of our present experience, we would not be able to respond
coherently in many multi-person interactions. Imagine guiding two others engaged in
the project of moving a table up some stairs. I address them from the sidelines, “It
needs to tilt to the left”, etc. In this interaction, I perceive them (yous) as a whole, and
I participate in the joint project by guiding their joint actions with directive addresses.
We are all aware of one another, and aware of this mutual awareness, which makes
it possible to be responsive to one another in this joint task. I do not process each
of their actions and perceptions separately, but as a whole. A complex co-ordination
of our three subjectivities takes place here: no-one is a mere observer, everyone is a
participant. It would be right to say that there is a straightforward first-person plural
going on here, as we are all jointly committed to a specific task, but I submit that it is
also the case that there is an asymmetry here between me and those moving the table:
I am also addressing them second-personally in terms of their joint action. As such
there is also a clear I-yous in play. (In addition, they respond tomy address, responding
primarily with their co-ordinated action, or perhaps with questions directed back at
me—this is the ‘we-you’ that makes up the other ‘reply’ aspect of a second-person
plural).
Just as retention is not recollection and protention is not anticipation, holding mul-
tiple points of awareness in attention simultaneously is not the same as adding together
different intersubjective interactions. Rather, there are elements of the awareness of
each person which play a constitutive role in the awareness of the others. Not only
does the awareness of each friend’s awareness of me ‘stamp’ my response with ‘new
characteristics’ creating new meaning, but their awareness of each others’ awareness
‘stamps’ both of their movements and responses with emergent meaning as well.
That which emerges between them is also part of what I am engaging with, as well
as with each of them as subjects. I perceive their behaviour as an intersubjective
interaction, as a pattern of subjects-in-relation-to-each-other. In such contexts each
individual’s behaviour is made meaningful as a part in the whole interaction. Indeed, I
see behaviour as ‘theirs’, and it’s possible to engage with it as such, namely to engage
with it as ‘yours’ (plural).
Of course, there is also straightforward recollection and anticipation in group inter-
action as well, and this is also part of everyday intersubjective interactions played out
in time. My emphasis here, however, is to note that it is not simply recollection and
anticipation that are at play in intersubjectivity. Recollection and anticipation bring
content about others and other others from ‘other times’ into the present, but intersub-
jective retention and protention are structural features of the interactions themselves,
not extrinsic add-ons to an otherwise self-contained experience, but intrinsic.
Consider another everyday example. Imagine being on a train and finding yourself
in proximity with a pair of others. They are clearly friends or a couple, one of them is
crying, the other comforting. You rummage through your bag and offer some tissues
to the one doing the comforting. This is a clear I-yous interaction—the comforting-
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and-being-comforted drama that’s playing out is one in which (from the first-person
perspective) I can see the structures of intersubjective reciprocity between these others,
and as such I can meaningfully engage with them as a ‘yous’, a second-person plural
subject. All parties understand what I’m doingwhen I hand the tissues to the comforter
rather than the comfortee: I am giving the tissues to ‘them’, or rather, to yous, to your
relational unit, and to the interaction playing out playing out between the two. At some
level this is very obvious. Just as Köhler notes that it is obvious that we see shapes
and hear melodies as wholes, so too with interpersonal interactions.
We can see why, therefore, the second-person plural can have a quality of attention
that is not problematically split or broken. Just as multiple notes can be contained
within the ‘horizon’ of the focus of my attention when listening to music, so too can
multiple subjectivities and their contributions to the unfolding whole. Understanding
subjects-in-relation as gestalt wholes hence speaks to the worry that it is not possible
to attend second-personally to more than one other at once.9 The musical analogy
also helps us note differences in the way that this argument about gestalt perception
of plural subjects opens up space for thinking about the second-person plural as well
as the third-person plural. We can perceive plural subjects as gestalt wholes from a
detached, spectatorial perspective just as we can listen to a piece of music that we
are not a participant in contributing to. Music is also something that we can engage
and participate in, however. We can consider scenarios in which we participate musi-
cally in multi-person contexts. Playing in a jazz trio will involve a first-person plural
perspective, of course, as ‘playing together’ is something that the whole group does
together. But I would argue that we also find more complex sets of interactions within
the group—the double-bass player, for example, waiting to join in, listens not only
to the drummer and the pianist separately, but also engages with the whole complex
sound that the two of them are already producing. Sheworks out how to enter themusic
as a participant, not only insofar as she is attuned to each of her musical colleagues,
but also to the whole that is already emerging between them.10
These analyses of concrete interactions provide phenomenological evidence for
the possibility of a substantial second-person plural. I turn now to look at the second
aspect of gestalt perception that I take to be relevant—that of underlying structure.
5 The structure(s) of others-in-relation
Just as amusical formhas anunderlying structurewhichdetermines how it is perceived,
I will now lay out how something comparable is at work in intersubjective interactions.
There are certain structures that underpin interpersonal reality, namely a very specific
set of structures of interpersonal reciprocity that interact with one another to give a
certain pattern that can be perceived. Just as the structure of music is built out of the
relationship between different soundwaves (experienced phenomenologically as tone,
9 There aremore factors to consider when thinking about the nature of attention in the second-person plural,
including the fact that attention is multi-sensory. I don’t have space to look at all of these other factors here.
Amore complete analysis of second-person plural attention can be found in my forthcoming doctoral thesis.
10 I thank an anonymous reviewer for prompting me to think about how the musical analogy can be
distinguished to apply to both the perceptual and participatory aspects of intersubjectivity.
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pitch, key change and so on), or the structure of a visual scene is a spatial relationship
between shapes and lines (experienced phenomenologically as distinctions between
‘figure’ and ground’, and so on), so the ‘structure’ of intersubjectivity is ‘built out
of’ the relationships of mutual awareness between subjects. And just as different
arrangements of notes give rise to different relationships or patterns between the notes,
so too when human subjects are ‘arranged differently’ and are mutually aware of each
other in different ways, different phenomena emerge.
My claim is that addressing a pair or a group is not the same as addressing each
member separately in parallel precisely because the object addressed (i.e. the interper-
sonal ‘object’ of the others-as-a-plural-subject) has an underlying structure or form,
which the addresser perceives, attends to and addresses as a unified whole. I can recog-
nise a pair as a system of two other subjects held together as a whole by a structure of
reciprocity between them. It is this structure which holds multiple subjects together
as ‘system’ that can be attended to without this involving a problematic division of
attention between multiple parts. Whether I see that they are engaged in mutual direct
attention of one another orwhether they are engaged in joint attention together towards
some object or task, I can engage them not simply as two isolated subjects doing their
own thing, related to one another by mere contiguity—rather, I perceive and engage
them as an interpersonal whole structured by specific patterns of reciprocity.11 In a
second-person plural address, I must be aware of the others as a plural subject who are
jointly committed to attending to me, that is, to giving and receiving communications
together.
Building on the dyadic formulation above, an example of the structure of intersub-
jective awareness in a case where C attends directly to A-and-B in addressing them,
such as when I address the couple on the train, is:
1. A is aware of B
2. B is aware of A
3. 1 and 2 are ‘out in the open’ between A and B
4. C attends to [A and B under the form 1–3]
5. A attends to C under the form 4
6. B attends to C under the form 4
Which is to say:
7. [A and B under the form 1–3] attend to C
8. 5, 6 and 7 are ‘out in the open’ between A, B (as A-and-B jointly) and C
As in the dyadic case, this formulation is designed to demonstrate that these different
elements of intersubjective awareness are constitutive of each other in their form, and
not just their content. It is for this reason that the form of such an interaction is non-
reducible to the mere addition of isolated parts. This is why I am able to attend not
simply to ‘you’ and to ‘you’ in parallel, but I can attend to ‘yous’: to you-and-you-in-
relation-to-one-another as a whole. This analysis is not a vague claim invoking a ‘more
than the sum of its parts’, but a recognition of the specific structures of interpersonal
reciprocity in play.
11 There is more to explore with regards the phenomenological differences in the perception of these
different structures of reciprocity, which I do not have space to look at here.
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Different forms of interpersonal reciprocal awareness produce different intersubjec-
tive structures, which give different gestalt qualities. This is why an I-you is different
to an I-yous, which is in turn different to a we-yous. As the forms of intersubjective
awareness change, this is a change in the underlying structures, and this gives rise to
a change in the phenomenology of the interaction. The jolt of realisation that there is
a third person in the room, following our conversation, when I (or we) thought it was
just the two of us in the room, highlights this phenomenological shift. This means,
as per the requirements of gestalt structure, that even where the component members
of an interaction are changed, we can identify similar structures which give rise to
similar gestalt qualities. We recognise similar structures in different contexts with
different people: I-you structures have identifiable features in all kinds of different
social contexts, as do I-yous structures. We can identify I-you, we, we-you, I-yous,
we-yous interactions which rely on (I have argued) the recognition of different inter-
personal wholes. These structures really exist and provide the foundation [Grundlage]
of the quality of these different intersubjective standpoints. These interactions involve
completely different people and can have a completely different relational content:
congratulating a couple on their wedding day is very different to facing a panel for a
job interview, for example, but there is a similarity of I-yous interpersonal structure
to both that is immediately visible.
6 Conclusion
In summary, I have outlined some relevant aspects of the phenomenology of multi-
person structures, including a phenomenological analysis of second-person plural
address. I have argued that there is good reason to think that we can adopt the language
and understanding of parts and wholes used by gestalt theory to understand these
phenomena non-reductively. We have as a result good reason to reject the claim that
we can only attend directly to one person at a time. This analysis functions as an
example of how phenomenology and gestalt theory can complement one another,
towards a non-reductive analysis of our engagement with the world beyond us.
This analysis also opens up further debate at the intersection of gestalt theory and
intersubjectivity and,morewidely, encourages further consideration of howan account
of the second-person plural as substantial feeds into other discourses that trade in the
importance of the second-person perspective. To return to Lewin, for example, it is
worth making explicit, in the light of my argument here, that nuanced attempts to do
a cartography of a subject’s ‘life space’ must recognise that the forces that shape this
space are not only forces from the individual on the group-as-a whole, or the group-
as-a-whole on the individual, but also that interactions within the group influence the
group and the individual, insofar as these interactions between members of the group
are complex, and effect other others in the group, which then also reverberates through
the whole. Further research in field theory with these more complex intersubjective
structures inmind could then prove fruitful. In this vein I have elsewhere started to look
at how mindfulness of multi-person structures such as the second-person plural can
itself facilitate nuance in multi-person discussions themselves, such as in university
seminar contexts (Pawlett Jackson 2016), an idea which invites further research and
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consideration. There is likewise further work to be done applying this consideration
of the second-person plural into ‘second-personal ethics’ (Darwall 2009)—where the
possibility of the second-person plural suggests that the intersubjective structures
which underpin moral obligation may be more complex than is currently reflected in
the literature. I suggest that these, and numerous other possible applications, indicate
that this analysis has much to offer ongoing research across a range of disciplines.12
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